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ABSTRACT 
Identity and Access Management (IAM) is an important aspect of information security. The 
deployment of cloud computing (CC) and cloud-based computing (CbC) creates a complex 
information security scenario involving multiple global stakeholders and geographically 
dispersed infrastructures. Therefore, implementing IAM in CC/CbC requires the 
consideration and consolidation of multiple factors. A trust-based approach towards 
information security may not be a credible option for the CC/CbC environment as trust-based 
relationships among different architectural elements and including human beings may pose an 
additional security threat to the cloud space. In this paper, we propose a zero-trust framework 
for federated IAM in CC/CbC. The proposed framework incorporates a decentralised 
approach towards IAM that aims to minimise any single entity’s controlling power over the 
digital assets in the CC/CbC space. The critical component of the proposed framework is the 
decentralised audit log. 
Keywords: Access management, identity management, zero-trust framework, federated 
security, cloud computing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Identity and Access Management (IAM) and access control is a critical component of 
distributed computing approaches such as Cloud Computing (CC) and Cloud-based 
Computing (CbC) including Internet of Things (IoT), Fog Computing and Edge Computing 
(Ahmed et al. 2020; Guo et al. 2019; Fan et al. 2017). Where CC/CbC services are offered on 
a commercial basis, the computing platforms are normally provided by a cloud service 
provider (CSP). A number of CSPs may pool their resources together in order to better 
manage cost and customer demand, forming a federated cloud (Ahmed, Nahar, Urmi, & 
Taher, 2020; Mashayekhy et al. 2019).  
A CSP serves and communicates with a number of different customers (individual or 
corporate). In the cloud environment, customer data and other digital assets reside within the 
CSPs’ physical infrastructure (i.e., in the CSPs’ computers known as cloud servers). 
Therefore, the mechanisms for managing access to customer resources has remained mainly 
CSP-centred (Indu et al. 2018). With CSPs responsible for IAM, cloud customers have 
become significantly CSP-reliant with respect to ensuring the safety and security of their 
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entrusted digital assets (Sen and Tiwari 2017). From a privacy and security point of view, 
customer over-dependency on the CSP as the custodian of customer digital assets is a major 
concern (Indu et al. 2018; Zhou et al. 2017). Even though service level agreements (SLAs) 
and legal considerations may help prevent a CSP from unauthorised ‘looking into’ into the 
spaces on their Cloud servers where clients’ digital assets are kept, the CSP may still retain 
the capability to perform unauthorised operation(s) on its clients’ data (Rizvi et al. 2020). 
Applying a less CSP-centred approach towards the deployment of cloud-based security and 
privacy protection would reduce significantly CSPs’ capability of sneaking into rooms 
allocated to clients (as a preventative measure), or at least make it nearly impossible for CSPs 
to hide their actions if they decide to do so (as a demotivational measure).  
Federated identity management is one of the foundations of digital identity management 
(Hamlen et al. 2011). However, in a traditional federation, the participating entities must 
maintain a level of trust as they exchange information about user authentication and 
authorization credentials (Chadwick, 2009). Conversely, in a zero-trust security model, 
participants such as network or networking elements are not trusted but are always verified 
(Assunção, 2019; Samaniego & Deters, 2018). In this paper, we propose a zero-trust federated 
IAM framework for CC/CbC that aims to prevent CSPs from gaining unauthorised access to 
customer digital assets placed under a CSP’s management and residing within the CSP’s 
infrastructure. This goal is achieved by ensuring that a CSP is not sufficiently motivated to 
use any available ‘backdoors’ to tamper with clients’ digital assets, for example by 
performing unauthorised Create-Read-Update-Delete (CRUD) operations, or any other 
unauthorised actions. The proposed framework focuses on authentication, as part of IAM. It 
enables the creation of an auditable trail of access attempts including ones originating from 
the CSP within whose infrastructure the digital assets of the customer (individual or 
corporate) are stored.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: a brief overview of related research is presented 
in the next section. The proposed framework is described and discussed in the remaining 
sections, including research limitations and envisioned further work.  
RELATED WORK 
An IAM system can be viewed as a framework that provides both policies and technologies to 
enable authorised access to CC/CbC resources (Carnley and Kettani 2019). Deploying an 
efficient IAM system may have a positive impact on individual and corporate customers’ 
adoption and continued use of CC/CbC services (Ahmed et al., 2020) 
 In CC/CbC, computing resources are distributed, with remote access provided by 
communication networks (e.g., the Internet) (Khalil et al. 2014); therefore, prior research has 
considered a number of different approaches towards developing a distributed IAM that meets 
user security and privacy protection expectations (Bendiab et al. 2019; Hamlen et al. 2011; 
Indu et al. 2018; Patel et al. 2013). For example, Horrow and Sardana (2012) propose an IAM 
framework that authenticates IoT users through an identity manager which in turn 
collaborates with a service manager within the IoT architecture. Bendiab et al. (2019) propose 
a trust model for a federated cloud IAM and note that existing federated IAM systems may 
not be well suited to the highly dynamic and open nature of the CC/CbC environments. 
Sharma et al. (2016) propose developing an IAM system as a cloud service (security-as-a-
service, SECaaS). Gupta and Quamara (2018) propose an identity-based access control and a 
mutual authentication framework for a distributed cloud-based IoT that includes the use of 
smart cards as a means to access cloud-based services (in the case of a single-CSP 
deployment scenario).  
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Despite the significant technology advancement, security breaches such as insufficient control 
over personal data dissemination and customer data leakage continue to occur (Eludiora et al. 
2011; Werner et al. 2017). The integration of IAM and the CC/CbC environment may face 
further technical challenges such as the need to conduct a large-scale penetration testing to 
validate the robustness of the proposed IAM (Chang et al. 2016), and organisational 
challenges related to the requirement to add a security dimension to the business processes of 
the organization adopting IAM (Everett 2011; Uddin and Preston 2015). Reed, Sporney, 
Longley, Allen, Grant, Sabdello and Holt (2020) propose Decentralised Identifiers (DIDs) 
which is a decentralised approach that enables verifiable, decentralised digital identity. 
As pointed out by Noor et al. (2013), an effective trust management approach may alleviate 
CC/CbC customers’ concerns about distributed digital asset security, and data privacy. In 
cloud federations in particular, the concept of ‘trust’ implies the existence of trust 
relationships between the participating entities and sharing the responsibility of maintaining a 
secure CC/CbC space (Mashayekhy et al. 2019). However, establishing trust is still a major 
concern in cloud federations where differing perceptions of shared responsibility may lead to 
fatal gaps in cybersecurity (Ahmed et al. 2019). A zero-trust approach helps to overcome this 
obstacle (Scott, 2018). In a zero-trust model, no trust-by-default is the standard premise 
(Ahmed et al. 2020). Eliminating the need to develop and maintain trust relationships 
removes a highly significant factor from the CC/CbC security space which should result in a 
better integrated and better secured CC/CbC architecture. 
A ZERO-TRUST IAM FRAMEWORK FOR CC/CbC 
As part of IAM, authentication and subsequent authorisation remain at the core of securing a 
distributed computing system (Sharma et al. 2016). Authentication allows the different parties 
involved to mutually ascertain each other’s identity before commencing actual 
communication across the distributed environment (Wang et al. 2020). Cloud-based resources 
are complex to both manage and protect as the distributed environment widens the doors to 
cyberattacks. However, malicious activities may go unnoticed as in the CC/CbC environment, 
it is often a significant challenge to identify a security breach. First, the cloud service 
customer may not have a complete knowledge of who the active IAM parties are, especially 
in a federated trust-based computing environment. Second, to trace down the activities of all 
parties involved in handling an organisation’s digital assets in the cloud space may be quite 
complex both legally, and technologically (Patel et al. 2013; Suganya and Sujatha 2020). To 
compound the issue, in any CC/CbC architecture, the distributed digital resources may not 
even reside under the management of a single entity. This adds to the challenges of providing 
reliable authentication and authorisation services across the CC/CbC plane (Porambage et al. 
2016).  
The decentralisation of the framework is inspired by the decentralisation approach to secure 
system proposed by Ahmed (2018). A multi-CSP authentication process lies at the heart of 
the proposed zero-trust framework. Multiple CSPs participate in a dynamic federation which 
provides an authentication service on request. The authentication process is not associated 
with any specific technology or tool. It works on the principle of decentralisation. The end-
user to be authenticated is a customer of one or more CSPs but not of all CSPs involved in the 
CSP federation. For any authentication request, each of the CSPs acts either as a ‘native-CSP’ 
or as an ‘audit-CSP’. A native-CSP stores digital assets belonging to the end-user and may 
also store some of their credential information. An audit-CSP contributes to the authentication 
process; it stores part of the end-user credentials but does not store any end-user digital assets. 
An audit-CSP must not be a native-CSP, and can be any of the foreign CSP. An audit CSP is 
a regular CSPs or a purpose built CSPs offering Auditing as a Service (AaaS). 
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An example illustrating the concept as presented in Figure 1. Here, CSP-a is a native-CSP 
while CSP-b and CSP-c are audit-CSPs. Assuming CSP-a does not store any part of the end-
user credential information, this CSP federation comprises the minimum number of CSPs 
required (i.e., three different CSPs). The CSP configuration can be expanded to include any 
number of CSPs.  
 
Figure 1. A Zero-Trust IAM Framework for CC/CbC  
 
More generally, the distribution of CSPs can be represented as 
∀q ∈ n, {(CSPA+1) > CSPN} ∧ CSPN=>1) ................................... (i) 
where: 
n = Total number of CSPs, CSPN = Total number of Native-CSPs, CSPA = Total number of 
Audit-CSPs, and q = a CSP. 
 
This implies that there needs to be at least one native-CSP, and that the total number of audit-
CSPs must be greater than the number of native-CSPs. The example in Figure 1 also shows 
how the flow of the authentication events reduces the opportunity of a CSP tampering with 
the authentication process or with the log. The steps of the authentication process are outlined 
and explained below. (Note: it is assumed that the partial end-user’s credential sent to audit-
CSP-c in step 4 is different from the one sent to audit-CSP-b in step 5.) 
1. End-user initiates a login request to a native-CSP (in this example, CSP-a). 
2. Native-CSP (CSP-a) informs the relevant audit-CSPs (in this example, CSP-b and 
CSP-c) about the login request.  
3. Audit-CSPs send an authentication (credential) request to the end- user. 
4. End-user sends a partial credential (e.g., a username) to an audit-CSP (in the example, 
CSP-c). 
5. End-user sends a partial credential (e.g., a password, or an access token) to an audit-
CSPs (in this example, CSP-b). 
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6. The audit-CSPs involved in steps 4 and 5 authenticate the end-user to the native-CSP 
(CSP-a). 
7. Audit-CSPs advise native-CSP on the outcome of authentication and all CSPs log the 
authentication details. 
The framework ensures that the full set of credential components (i.e., the complete 
information required for the successful authentication of the end-user) is not held by any 
participating CSP). Secret (challenge) end-user credentials are distributed across multiple 
audit-CSPs (or across multiple groups of audit-CSPs). To achieve the purpose of not allowing 
any single entity (or a single group of entities) to have control over the end-user 
authentication credentials, the two audit groups should not overlap, and should never share 
with each other the end-user credential they store. Furthermore, the secret credential stored by 
one of the groups should not be interchangeable with the secret credential stored by the other 
group. As shown in Figure 2, if the end-user has two different pieces of secret authentication 
credentials A and B, and a non-challenge credential C, at least two audit-CSPs (or two groups 
of audit-CSPs) will be required for successful authentication. 
 
Figure 2. Parties Involved in the Authentication Process  
A native-CSP may store a non-challenge part of the full set of credentials (e.g., the username), 
or may store only some of the challenge part of the credential set (e.g., one of the factors in 
the case of multi-factor authentication, or part of an access key but not the whole key). In the 
example in Figure 2, the participating native-CSP uses their knowledge of the non-challenge 
component C in order to complete the end-user authentication. For best results, the challenge 
part of the credential set (i.e., the user’s secret) should not be stored by a native-CSP even 
partially. Ideally, it should be stored is a decentralised manner by the audit-CSPs.  
 
The general rule of distribution of the user credential information can be represented as  
∀D ∃ (n ∈ N) ∧ (Auth-CSPA > Auth-CSPN | Auth-CSPA ∉ Auth-CSPN) .................... (ii) 
where: 
n = Total number of credential components, N = Natural numbers, Auth-CSPA = Credential 
information stored in audit-CSPs, Auth-CSPN = Credential information stored in native-CSPs, 
and D = Distribution of credential information among CSPs. 
 
The above implies that the distribution of the end-user credentials must ensure that 
authenticating audit-CSPs hold more pieces of credential information than authenticating 
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native-CSPs, and that a native-CSPs should not act as an authenticating CSP since native 
CSPs may store only a non-challenge part of users’ credentials. 
The proposed framework requires an audit log where each activity related to the 
authentication of a particular end-user is recorded as a separate transaction. Thus, the audit 
log provides a map of the authentication process flow and makes available for inspection the 
full audit trail of login attempts. Importantly, in order to support the provision of a robust 
federated and decentralised user authentication process, the audit log should not be fully 
stored by any participating CSP. In other words, the audit log should be maintained and 
managed in a decentralised manner, with any participating CSP storing only a part of the 
resulting distributed login transaction database.  
Second, to ensure that audit log records already made are not modified, the decentralised audit 
log should never be updated except for adding new transactions (i.e., the audit log database 
should allow only ‘read’ and ‘append’ operations). To avoid losing its credibility in the case 
of any integrity breach affecting the audit log, the framework should have a ‘healing’ 
capability, such as keeping backup copies that would allow the system to ‘roll back’. 
However, maintaining multiple redundant copies of the audit log database may present a 
challenge due to its decentralised nature.   
DISCUSSION 
The traditional centralised approach to end-user authentication may increase organisations’ 
exposure to credential harvesting and identity theft (Abayomi-Zannu and Odun-Ayo 2019). 
The proposed framework addresses this concern by providing for a federated, decentralised 
authentication system. In contrast to the still prevalent trust-based approach to IAM (Keltoum 
and Samia, 2017; Bendiab et al. 2019), the framework applies a zero-trust principle, i.e., it 
removes’ trust’ from the operational context of the authentication process. The innovation of 
the proposed framework stands in it’s using decentralised processing involving multi-party 
management of the authentication process in a zero-trust security environment. The 
framework facilitates the collaborative work of the CSPs involved in the federation but does 
not establish or require any trust-based relationships among them  
The aim of the proposed framework is to discourage the malicious insiders (e.g., CSP, or any 
individual) through an unavoidable, non-erasable and traceable footprint. The IAM system is 
decentralised in such a way that no single participating entity ‘owns’ the total sum of a 
customer’s credentials (and digital assets). This reduces significantly the power of any single 
CSP to control the authentication process or to commit any unauthorised modification 
(through bypassing standard authentication procedures) of the audit log. Therefore, 
participating CSPs will be unlikely to access client assets in an unauthorised manner, due both 
to their limited knowledge of the relevant client credentials, and the exposed nature of the 
shared audit log. Second, the proposed framework enables the detection of security incidents, 
as it equips the CC/ CbC environment with a mechanism to ensure that a breach cannot be 
kept hidden once it occurs.  
The decentralised audit log described in the preceding section is a critical component of the 
proposed framework. While the inability to delete or update any existing information is a key 
requirement, an in-depth consideration of the design and deployment of an ‘append only’ 
mechanism for maintaining a decentralised audit log is out of the scope of this paper. The 
architecture for a distributed and decentralised security model for CC proposed in (Ahmed, 
2018) and the related algorithm for preventing unauthorised data modification through 
decentralisation in (Ahmed & Sarkar, 2020) may provide some useful references. With its 
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strong support of decentralisation, blockchain technology (Nakamoto, 2017; Pilkington, 2016) 
may be also considered as a potential decentralisation mechanism. 
A possible limitation of framework is the potential for implementation-related processing 
bottlenecks or other system performance issues. In addition, decentralised computing may 
incur operational overheads due for example to multiple instances of the same process 
running concurrently, or other redundancy requirements. 
Directions for further work and research include the development of a reliable mechanism for 
achieving the decentralisation of the audit log and meeting its functional requirements (the 
audit log should be ‘write-once’ and there should be no way to modify any existing records). 
Carefully selecting an existing technology that may serve the purpose and developing a proof-
of-concept system would be instrumental in demonstrating the benefits of the proposed 
framework in comparison to other approaches, and in addressing the limitations identified 
above. We also intend to further explore the feasibility of including (or excluding) native-
CSPs from a security perspective. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed zero-trust IAM framework is a conceptual one. It can be implemented using 
any technologies that can serve the purpose. While authentication (and subsequently, 
authorisation) is key to ensuring that legitimate users are provided with information access 
according to their legitimate privileges, it is equally important to ensure the existence of 
write-protected evidence of the login events. The proposed framework meets these 
requirements by employing a zero-trust approach that is complemented by a ‘write-once’ 
event log system. The decentralisation and the involvement of multiple CSPs is to ensure that 
there is no single entity in control of the authentication process and that all login attempts are 
securely receded and open to inspection. However, the framework requires the deployment of 
an additional mechanism to protect the trust-less model from unauthorised modifications of 
the shared audit log.  
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